The Prince (Il Principe)

This summary was created by AI (Konspekto) from the text of this edition. Quotes are checked against the book text automatically.

About this edition

• Author: Niccolò Machiavelli
• Title: The Prince (Il Principe)
• Edition: J. M. Dent & Sons, London / E. P. Dutton, New York, 1908
• Translator: William Kenaz Marriott
• Edition language: English
• Original language: Italian
• Content pages: p. 1–216
• Rights: Public domain

About the author (AI note, not from the book's text)

Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527) was a Florentine diplomat, political writer, and historian. His other works include Discourses on Livy and Florentine Histories.

In brief

How can a prince acquire a state and retain it despite resistance, dependence, and changing circumstances? Machiavelli’s answer rests on building independent military strength, securing domestic support, and judging conduct by its consequences for political survival. Established dynasties benefit from familiar customs; new rulers must overcome competing loyalties and create foundations that inherited authority already supplies. Those elevated by outside power or luck face particular difficulty because acquiring office does not itself provide the means to keep it. Military independence is essential: hired troops and borrowed armies can expose a ruler to either defeat or domination. Preparation must continue during peace. Political conduct likewise requires attention to circumstances rather than an unvarying commitment to admired qualities. Generosity can produce burdensome taxation, while severity may preserve order. Yet measures that provoke hatred or contempt undermine security by weakening support and encouraging conspiracy. The same conditional judgment governs fortifications, alliances, public achievements, and advice. A fortress cannot compensate for a hostile population, and useful counsel requires a ruler capable of assessing it. Italy’s lost states illustrate the costs of neglected defenses and reliance on rescue. Fortune can be resisted through preparation, but success also depends on whether a ruler’s methods fit changing conditions. Italy’s vulnerability therefore offers an opening for a leader who can organize effective forces, end foreign domination, and win lasting loyalty.

Key ideas

1. New rulers lack the customary acceptance that helps established dynasties survive. Securing a conquest requires dealing with its institutions and existing loyalties, since former dynasties and remembered freedom can sustain opposition. Founders must defeat beneficiaries of the previous order and establish an independent basis of authority. — p. 1–27, 29–41, 43–63, 65–73, 75–82
2. Subjects strengthen a ruler’s security when they have reasons to support him, but hatred and contempt weaken it. Popular support can discourage revolt and help withstand a siege; repeated mistreatment and interference with property erode that support, and fortifications cannot reliably compensate for its loss. — p. 1–27, 29–41, 51–63, 65–73, 75–94, 131–145, 147–163, 165–173
3. Dependence on troops paid or commanded by others puts a state at risk: their defeat can destroy it, while their victory can cost it independence. Both established rulers and conquerors therefore need forces under their own control, sustained by military preparation and competent leadership. — p. 43–63, 83–118, 165–173, 183–199, 209–216
4. Political survival may require actions normally judged wrong, but their consequences determine their usefulness. Severity can reestablish order, whereas conspicuous generosity can require taxes that provoke resentment. A ruler should limit avoidable hatred, earn respect, obtain frank advice, and accept the smaller risk when every available course carries danger. — p. 65–73, 119–145, 147–163, 175–199
5. Fortune supplies opportunities and reversals, but preparation and methods appropriate to circumstances shape a ruler’s ability to exploit one or withstand the other. Italian rulers lost their states after failing to maintain their defenses. Italy’s resulting weakness offers a new leader an opportunity, provided he builds effective laws and military forces instead of relying on outside rescue. — p. 1–27, 43–63, 105–118, 175–199, 201–207, 209–216

Summary by chapter

Dedication — III. Concerning mixed principalities (p. 1–27)

• Machiavelli offers Lorenzo knowledge drawn from current affairs and ancient history. He distinguishes republics from hereditary and new principalities, which can be acquired through arms, fortune, or ability.
• Hereditary princes usually remain secure by observing established customs. New rulers face disappointed supporters, harmed subjects, and the burdens of conquest; even a strong conqueror needs local goodwill.
• A ruler can secure a territory similar to his own by removing its former dynasty while leaving its laws and taxes intact. In a different territory, residence or inexpensive colonies are preferable to garrisons that alienate inhabitants, and powerful rivals must be checked early.
• Louis XII lost Lombardy after strengthening the Church, inviting Spain, deserting weaker allies, failing to reside there or establish colonies, and weakening Venice. Raising another power to dominance risks ruin because that power will distrust its benefactor.

IV. Why the kingdom of Darius did not rebel against the successors of Alexander — V. Concerning the way to govern cities or principalities which lived under their own laws (p. 29–41)

• A kingdom governed through ministers dependent on its ruler is difficult to conquer, but easier to keep once the ruling family is removed. Hereditary barons can help an invader enter, yet can also sustain resistance.
• Alexander’s successors faced no rebellions in Darius’s kingdom apart from those arising from their own rivalries. Rome’s formerly divided territories remained insecure until memories of their previous rulers faded.
• A conqueror can destroy a formerly free city, reside in it, or leave its laws in place under a tribute-paying oligarchy dependent on him. Destruction or residence is safest because memories of freedom can provoke rebellion.

VI. Concerning principalities acquired by one's own arms and ability (p. 43–50)

• Rulers should learn from exceptional founders. Ability makes a new state easier to retain, but an opportunity benefits a founder only if he recognizes and uses it.
• Those who benefited from old institutions resist new ones, while prospective beneficiaries hesitate to defend them. A founder without his own force cannot maintain the new order when public belief weakens.
• Able founders face their greatest dangers while acquiring power and can hold it more easily afterward. Hiero turned his appointment as captain into rule by replacing existing troops and alliances with his own.

VII. Concerning new principalities acquired by the arms of others or by good fortune (p. 51–63)

• Princes raised by another’s arms or by fortune gain power easily but usually lack loyal forces and governing experience. Unless unusually capable, they must build after accession the foundations that self-made rulers built before it.
• Cesare Borgia tried to escape dependence on French troops and factional allies by winning over rival followers, eliminating their leaders, and establishing order through a severe governor. He then executed the governor to turn public resentment away from himself.
• Borgia’s preparations might have secured his rule had his father lived or he remained healthy. Despite approving much of his strategy, Machiavelli blames Borgia’s ruin on his support for a papal candidate whom he had injured.

VIII. Concerning those who have obtained a principality by wickedness (p. 65–73)

• Agathocles gained power through military skill and the murder of Syracuse’s leaders, then held it against Carthage. Machiavelli credits his courage as a commander but denies him glory because of his cruelty and betrayal.
• Oliverotto took Fermo by inviting its leaders to a banquet and killing them. Further killings and new institutions secured his rule until Cesare Borgia captured him.
• A usurper who inflicts necessary injuries all at once may later reassure subjects through benefits. Repeated injuries prevent loyalty, while severity or concessions first attempted during a crisis arrive too late.

IX. Concerning a civil principality (p. 75–82)

• A citizen can become prince through the favor of nobles or the people. Popular support is easier to maintain because the people chiefly want protection, whereas nobles seek power over others and may rebel.
• A prince should honor loyal nobles, employ capable nobles who hold back from fear, and distrust ambitious holdouts. Even a ruler elevated by nobles must win the people, whose support can endure adversity if he leads courageously.
• Rule exercised through magistrates is fragile in a crisis because subjects are used to obeying officials rather than the prince. Since promises made in calm times may fail under pressure, he should make citizens depend on him and the state.

X. Concerning the way in which the strength of all principalities ought to be measured — XI. Concerning ecclesiastical principalities (p. 83–94)

• Princes with sufficient troops or money can fight independently. Those who cannot take the field should fortify and provision their towns, since strong defenses and popular support discourage attackers and help sustain loyalty through a siege.
• Religious institutions preserve ecclesiastical states regardless of a ruler’s conduct. Papal territorial power nevertheless remained limited while Roman factions took advantage of short reigns and other Italian powers blocked expansion.
• Alexander VI’s arms and wealth strengthened the Church, though he intended to advance the duke. Julius II consolidated those gains, enlarged the territory, and curbed Roman factions by withholding cardinalships from them.

XII. How many kinds of soldiery there are, and concerning mercenaries (p. 95–104)

• A state needs sound laws and armed strength, but its laws depend on its ability to fight. Mercenaries and auxiliaries cannot secure it because pay gives them too little reason to risk death.
• A capable mercenary commander may take power from his employer, while an incapable one invites defeat. Princes should lead their own forces, and republics should keep citizen commanders under legal control.
• As Italian churches and republics hired soldiers from outside their own communities, paid captains emphasized cavalry and avoided dangerous fighting to protect their livelihoods. These practices weakened Italy and exposed it to foreign attack.

XIII. Concerning auxiliaries, mixed soldiery, and one's own — XIV. That which concerns a prince on the subject of the art of war (p. 105–118)

• Auxiliaries answer to another ruler: if they lose, they ruin the prince who summoned them, and if they win, they can hold him captive. Their unified command makes them more dangerous than mercenaries, so a prudent prince uses his own troops.
• Mixed forces are better than mercenaries or auxiliaries alone, but worse than troops drawn from the prince’s subjects, citizens, or dependents. Foreign troops weaken domestic military strength and leave a state dependent on fortune.
• Military skill helps a prince keep his state, while neglect may cost him it. In peacetime he should train troops, learn the terrain, think through battlefield choices, and study earlier commanders.

XV. Concerning things for which men, and especially princes, are praised or blamed — XVI. Concerning liberality and meanness (p. 119–130)

• Because actual conduct differs from ideals, a prince must recognize when wrongdoing is needed to preserve his state. A seeming virtue can destroy him, while a seeming vice can protect him.
• Trying to appear generous can drain a ruler’s resources and force him to levy hated taxes. Thrift can instead pay for defense and other undertakings without burdening subjects.
• Generosity can help someone seeking power but endanger a ruler who already holds it. A prince campaigning with resources taken from others must share them to keep his soldiers, whereas spending his own resources calls for restraint.

XVII. Concerning cruelty and clemency — XVIII. Concerning the way in which princes should keep faith (p. 131–145)

• Limited severity can preserve unity and military discipline, but a prince should use it deliberately and avoid hatred, particularly by respecting subjects’ property. When he cannot be both loved and feared, fear is safer.
• Because law alone often fails and others break their promises, a prince needs force as well as cunning. He may break a pledge when keeping it would harm him and the circumstances that justified it have disappeared.
• A prince should appear virtuous and act well when possible, yet remain ready to do otherwise to preserve the state. Most people judge rulers by what they appear to be and by the results they achieve.

XIX. That one should avoid being despised and hated (p. 147–163)

• Respect for subjects’ property and honor helps a prince avoid hatred, while decisive action helps him avoid contempt. Popular goodwill deters conspirators because they cannot count on support after an attack.
• France’s arbiter limits nobles and protects commoners without drawing blame onto the king. Roman emperors faced a further conflict: soldiers sought rewards and violence, while the people wanted peace.
• Marcus’s inherited position sheltered his humane rule. Pertinax and Alexander lost the soldiers’ support or respect, whereas Severus maintained power through military loyalty, a formidable reputation, and calculated deception.
• Hatred or contempt brought down other emperors as well. Most contemporary rulers should favor the more powerful populace over soldiers, except where armies sustain the state; new princes should adapt Severus’s methods of founding a regime to their own circumstances.

XX. Are fortresses advantageous or hurtful? (p. 165–173)

• A new prince should arm his subjects to build loyalty, but should disarm an annexed province and eventually depend on troops from his original state.
• Factions may make a population easier to manage in peacetime but weaken it in war. Former opponents who need the prince’s support can become loyal, while supporters driven only by discontent are difficult to satisfy.
• Fortresses are useful when subjects pose the greater danger, not when foreign powers do. Neither building nor avoiding them makes popular hatred safe, because outsiders can support a rebellion.

XXI. How a prince should conduct himself so as to gain renown (p. 175–182)

• Ambitious enterprises and visible achievements bring esteem. Ferdinand’s successive campaigns impressed and occupied his subjects while denying opponents time to organize against his growing power.
• A prince should take a clear side rather than remain neutral, but should not help a stronger power attack others unless necessity demands it. Prudence means choosing the smaller danger, not expecting a choice without risk.
• A prince should honor talent, reward enterprise, and protect citizens from confiscation and oppressive taxes. He should take part in public festivities without diminishing the dignity of his office.

XXII. Concerning the secretaries of princes — XXIV. Why the princes of Italy have lost their states (p. 183–199)

• A prince’s choice of capable and loyal ministers demonstrates his judgment. He should reject self-serving officials and encourage honest service through rewards, shared responsibilities, and their dependence on him.
• A prince can deter flattery without forfeiting respect by choosing advisers who may answer frankly, questioning them broadly, and then making and holding to his own decision. Good advice still depends on his own wisdom.
• Effective rule can earn a new prince firm loyalty. Italy’s displaced rulers instead neglected arms, failed to secure the people or nobles, and counted on rescue rather than preparing their own defense.

XXV. What fortune can effect in human affairs (p. 201–207)

• Fortune governs roughly half of human action, but preparation can reduce its harm. Italy’s lack of defenses exposed it to an invasion that stronger defenses might have prevented.
• A prince prospers when his methods fit the times, yet temperament and earlier success make change difficult. Persisting with the same approach can bring ruin when conditions shift.
• Julius II’s boldness succeeded by forcing hesitant powers to react, but it would have ruined him under conditions that required caution. Machiavelli nevertheless favors audacity over caution in confronting fortune.

XXVI. An exhortation to liberate Italy from the barbarians (p. 209–216)

• Italy’s devastation and its readiness to follow a liberator make the moment unusually favorable for a new prince. Machiavelli urges the house leading the Church to seize it.
• Divine favor cannot replace human effort. The house must establish new laws and military arrangements, because poor leadership and the old order have wasted Italian valor.
• A new Italian force could exploit the Spanish infantry’s vulnerability to cavalry and the Swiss infantry’s vulnerability in close combat. Machiavelli expects a leader who ends foreign domination to win widespread devotion.

How to apply it

• Build forces under the ruler’s own control rather than relying on mercenaries or allied armies when securing a state.
• Maintain military preparation during peace so that resources and defenses are ready when conditions deteriorate.
• Protect subjects from repeated injuries and violations of property when seeking durable support rather than relying on fortifications alone.
• Restrain spending when a reputation for generosity would require taxation that breeds resentment.
• Choose capable ministers and establish a controlled channel for candid advice while retaining responsibility for judgment.
• Match political methods to changing circumstances rather than assuming that a previously successful approach will always work.

Quotes

“Thus it happens in affairs of state, for when the evils that arise have been foreseen (which it is only given to a wise man to see), they can be quickly redressed, but when, through not having been foreseen, they have been permitted to grow in a way that every one can see them, there is no longer a remedy.” — p. 22

“Because the innovator has for enemies all those who have done well under the old conditions, and lukewarm defenders in those who may do well under the new.” — p. 48

“These arms may be useful and good in themselves, but for him who calls them in they are always disadvantageous; for losing, one is undone, and winning, one is their captive.” — p. 107

“And there is nothing wastes so rapidly as liberality, for even whilst you exercise it you lose the power to do so, and so become either poor or despised, or else, in avoiding poverty, rapacious and hated.” — p. 130

“All these things considered then, I shall praise him who builds fortresses as well as him who does not, and I shall blame whoever, trusting in them, cares little about being hated by the people.” — p. 173

“Therefore it must be inferred that good counsels, whencesoever they come, are born of the wisdom of the prince, and not the wisdom of the prince from good counsels.” — p. 193

“I conclude therefore that, fortune being changeful and mankind steadfast in their ways, so long as the two are in agreement men are successful, but unsuccessful when they fall out.” — p. 207